Charles R. Deets
Jeffrey A. Modisett
James A. Garrard
Heide Sandy Deets & Kennedy
Attorneys for Appellee
Attorney General of Indiana
Deputy Attorney General
Charles R. Deets
Jeffrey A. Modisett
James A. Garrard
TOMMIE C. PURCELL
Appellant (Defendant below).
STATE OF INDIANA
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
) Supreme Court No.
) Court of Appeals No.
prison, the trial court placed him on home detention under the supervision of a community
corrections program. After 690 days, the home detention placement was revoked and he
was committed to the Department of Correction. We hold, as did the Court of Appeals, that
he is entitled to 690 days credit for time actually served toward the three-year sentence.
On November 3, 1997, the trial court revoked Defendant's placement in the home detention program and ordered him to serve his full, original three-year sentence incarcerated through the Indiana Department of Correction. The court credited Defendant eighteen
days for pre-trial time served and good time, but did not credit him 690 days for time
actually served in home detention.
Defendant appealed, claiming the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve his
full, original three-year sentence in jail and denied his Motion to Correct Erroneous Sentence and for Time Served Credit. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Defendant
was entitled to credit on his original sentence for time served in home detention. Purcell v.
State, 700 N.E.2d 815, 817 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
We now grant transfer, thereby vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals pursuant
to Ind. Appellate Rule 11(B)(3). However, we agree with the Court of Appeals's result and
reverse the trial court's sentencing decision.
former as credit for time served and the latter as good time credit.
This distinction plays itself out in the present case in the following way. As noted, Defendant was sentenced to three years and ordered to serve that time on home detention pursuant to a community corrections placement.See footnote 4 Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6-6(a) (Supp. 1994) provides in relevant part: A person who is placed in a community corrections program under this chapter is entitled to earn credit time under Ind. Code § 35-50-6 unless the person is placed in the person's home. It is clear that because Defendant was placed in his own home, he did not earn credit time under Ind. Code § 35-50-6 during the 690 days he spent on home detention. But what is meant by credit time in this context?
The trial court concluded (and the State argues in this appeal) that credit time means
credit for time served. Under this reading, Defendant, because he was placed in his own
home, was not entitled to any credit toward his three-year sentence for the 690 days served
on home detention.
Defendant contends (and the Court of Appeals agreed) that credit time means good
time credit, not credit for time served. Under this reading, Defendant, because he was
placed in his own home, was not entitled to the additional days of credit time for each day
served on good behavior. But he was entitled to 690 days credit toward his three-year
sentence for the time he actually served.
We agree with Defendant's and the Court of Appeals's reading. Ind. Code § 35-38-
2.6-6 deprives the offender serving time on home detention of the ability to earn credit time
under Ind. Code § 35-50-6 (emphasis supplied). Ind. Code § 35-50-6 sets forth the
procedures for earning good time credit; it does not address credit for time served. Thus we
conclude that Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6-6 does not restrict the ability of an offender in home
detention to earn credit for time served.
We believe the legislature's intent is made clear by its language in Ind. Code § 35-38-
2.6-5 (1993): If a person who is placed [in a community corrections program] violates the
terms of the placement, the court may . . . [r]evoke the placement and commit the person to
the department of correction for the remainder of the person's sentence (emphasis supplied). If an offender was not entitled to credit for time served, the commitment after
revocation would not be for the remainder of the offender's sentence but for the entire
In reaching this conclusion, we find it necessary to address two propositions that
appear to cut in the opposite direction.
The first proposition relates to the suspended sentence language in Ind. Code § 35-
38-2.6-4 (1993). That section provides: If the court places a person in a community
corrections program under this chapter, the court shall suspend the sentence for a fixed
period to end not later than the date the suspended sentence expires. This language can be
read to mean that when a community corrections placement is made, the sentence is held in
abeyance and no time accrues toward it. But we believe such a reading would be in conflict
with the reference in Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6-6
to Ind. Code § 35-50-6 (providing good time
credit for community corrections placements other than those in home detention) and the
reference to remainder in Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6-5(3). Where two or more statutes
contradict each other or are in apparent conflict, we attempt to construe them in a manner
which reasonably brings them into harmony. Quakenbush v. Lackey, 622 N.E.2d 1284,
1290 (Ind. 1993). In order to harmonize it with those two references, we believe the legislature's reference to a suspended sentence in this context means that any requirement that
the offender actually serve time incarcerated through the Department of Correction (commonly referred to as executed time) is suspended during the community corrections
The second proposition relates to our decision in Franklin v. State, 685 N.E.2d 1062 (Ind. 1997). There we held that a defendant was not entitled to credit toward the defen
dant's sentence for time actually served on pre-trial home detention. We were wrong (for
the reasons set forth above) to cite Ind. Code § 33-38-2.6-6 as supporting that conclusion.See footnote
To the extent that Franklin holds that Ind. Code 35-38-2.6-6 prohibits an offender sentenced
to home detention under a community corrections program from earning credit for time
served, it is overruled.