ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER:    ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT:
DAVID L. PIPPEN    STEVE CARTER    
ATTORNEY AT LAW     ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA
Indianapolis, IN    Indianapolis, IN
    
     JANET L. PARSANKO
    DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
    Indianapolis, IN
    

_____________________________________________________________________

    IN THE INDIANA TAX COURT _____________________________________________________________________

ABOITE CORPORATION,                                                       )
                                                                               )
    Petitioner,                                                                )
                                                                               )
    v.                                                                         )   Cause No. 49T10-9701-TA-102        
             
                                                                        
                                                                                                                                                      )
STATE BOARD OF TAX COMMISSIONERS,                                              )
                                                                               )
    Respondent.                                                                )    
 _____________________________________________________________________
     

Whether the State Board erroneously calculated the amount of obsolescence depreciation to which Aboite’s shopping center is entitled?

Whether the State Board’s assessment of the shopping center’s atrium is arbitrary and capricious? See footnote

Ind. Code § 6-1.1-4-12. Aboite argues that, pursuant to the statute, “Indiana law does not allow for the re-classification of the [lot] until title changes.” (Pet’r Post-Hrg. Br. at 6.) Thus, Aboite argues, the State Board is precluded from reassessing the lot until its title is transferred to a third party. The State Board, on the other hand, argues that regardless of the fact that the lot had been subdivided, because it has changed from an “agricultural” to a “commercial” use, the statute requires that “it shall be reassessed on the basis of its new classification.” See Ind. Code § 6-1.1-4-12.
Generally, courts are not at liberty to construe a statute that is unambiguous. City of Evansville v. Zirkelbach, 662 N.E.2d 651, 653 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. “However, where a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, it is ambiguous and the reviewing court must ascertain the intent of the legislature and interpret the statute to effectuate that intent.” Id. Thus, in construing Indiana Code § 6-1.1-4-12, this Court will interpret the statute as a whole, and not overemphasize a strict literal or selective reading of its individual words. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indiana Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 671 N.E.2d 493, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
Indiana Code § 6-1.1-4-12 requires that land be reassessed upon the occurrence of two events: when acreage is subdivided into lots, and when land is put to a different use. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-4-12. Aboite relies on the “exception” stated in Indiana Code § 6-1.1-4-12: “if land assessed on an acreage basis is subdivided into lots, the lots may not be reassessed until the next assessment date following a transaction which results in a change in legal or equitable title to that lot.” Ind. Code § 6-1.1-4-12. The plain, ordinary meaning of this exception, however, presumes that acreage is subdivided into lots so that they may be sold, and until the lots are sold, its owner “reaps the benefit” of a lower assessment (footnote 2, supra). In other words, the exception is designed to encourage developers to buy farmland, subdivide it into lots, and resell the lots.
In this case, not only did Aboite not sell its vacant lot, but it built a shopping center on it instead. Assuming arguendo that Aboite merely decided to “hold off” in selling its vacant lot until a later date, the intent of the exception would prevail, and the land would continue to be assessed on its original agricultural acreage basis. Because Aboite converted the vacant lot into an income-producing property, however, the intent of the exception is frustrated. Indeed, the exception applies when land is subdivided into lots only, not when a change of use occurs. As a result, the State Board properly reassessed the lot from agricultural to commercial.
“Another fundamental rule of statutory construction is that if a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, then the court may consider the consequences of a particular construction.” Herff Jones v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 512 N.E.2d 485, 490-91 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1987) (citation omitted). In Indiana, land is assessed as either “agricultural” or “non-agricultural.” See 50 IAC 2.1-2-1 (non-agricultural land valuation); 50 IAC 2.1-2-2 (agricultural land valuation). If Aboite’s position were advanced, however, commercial developers could always escape a “non-agricultural” assessment by merely purchasing farmland, subdividing the acreage into lots, keeping some of the lots, changing the use, and not reselling the retained lots (which is what occurred here). It is difficult to believe that the legislature intended such an absurd result. Accordingly, the State Board’s final determination on the issue of land reassessment is AFFIRMED.