FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
JOHN R. McKAY JAMES L. LOWRY
Hickam and Hickam Kendall Wood Lowry & Kessinger
Spencer, Indiana Danville, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
IN THE MATTER OF C.S., )
)
LILAC PARKER, )
)
Appellant-Respondent, )
)
vs. ) No. 67A01-9807-JV-252
)
PUTNAM COUNTY OFFICE OF FAMILY )
AND CHILDREN, and CHRISTINE LANE, )
)
Appellees-Petitioners, )
)
LARRY SIMPSON, )
)
Appellee-Respondent. )
APPEAL FROM THE PUTNAM CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Diana LaViolette, Judge
Cause No. 67C01-9704-JC-4 and 67C01-9712-GU-30
June 30, 1999
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
MATTINGLY, Judge
Lilac Parker (Mother) appeals the entry of a guardianship over her child, C.S. She
raises two issues, which we restate as whether the trial court properly entered the
guardianship when a Child in Need of Services (CHINS) action involving the child was
pending before it and when a custody modification action involving the child was pending
in another county.
We reverse and remand.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 7, 1997, the Putnam County Office of Family and Children (the OFC) filed
a petition in the Putnam Circuit Court alleging that C.S. was in need of services. C.S. was
removed from Mother's home at that time and was placed with her paternal grandmother,
Christine Lane (Grandmother). The paternity of C.S. had previously been established in the
Owen Circuit Court and custody awarded to Mother. A petition to modify custody filed in
Owen County in May of 1997 was continued by that Court pending the disposition of the
CHINS proceeding.
After a hearing, the Putnam Circuit Court determined on September 23, 1997 that C.S.
was in need of services and declared C.S. a ward of that Court. The Court ordered that C.S.
was to continue to reside with Grandmother. In a separate action in December of 1997,
Grandmother petitioned in the Putnam Circuit Court to be appointed the legal guardian of
C.S. Mother objected on grounds "the CHINS action takes precedence over any other filing
in this particular matter, and the relief requested cannot be granted due to the pre-eminent
nature of the CHINS proceeding[.]" R. at 130.
On March 5, 1998 and May 28, 1998, the Putnam Circuit Court held hearings in
which it purported to address both the guardianship petition and the CHINS action.See footnote
1
In an
order issued under the CHINS cause number on June 2, 1998, the Putnam Circuit Court
ordered that the guardianship petition be granted and "[t]hat jurisdiction over [C.S.] under
this cause be relinquished and this cause closed." Id. at 107.
On June 30, 1998, the Putnam Circuit Court issued an order under the guardianship
cause number. It noted that it had previously determined C.S. to be a CHINS and that C.S.
was in need of a guardian for that reason and because of her minority. It further noted that
efforts to reunify C.S. and her parents had been unsuccessful and that continued placement
of C.S. outside the parents' home was necessary. It thus granted Grandmother's petition to
be appointed guardian for C.S.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Mother argues the Putnam Circuit Court should have dismissed the guardianship
petition when it was filed during the pendency of the CHINS action.See footnote
2
We agree. The filing
of Grandmother's guardianship petition and the hearings on that petition took place while
C.S. was the subject of a CHINS proceeding and thus the guardianship proceedings were
conducted in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The initiation of a CHINS proceeding places the subject matter of child custody
exclusively within the juvenile court's jurisdiction to adjudicate, and no other court may
exercise such jurisdiction while that CHINS proceeding is pending. Alexander v. Cole, 697
N.E.2d 80, 82-83 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). When the Putnam Circuit Court accepted the
guardianship petition and subsequently addressed the guardianship in its hearings on March
5 and May 28, 1998, it was purportedly acting in its capacity as a probate court. However,
on the date of those hearings, the custody of C.S. was exclusively within the juvenile court's
jurisdiction to adjudicate because C.S. was still the subject of a CHINS proceeding. The
petition and the hearings were therefore a nullity to the extent they purported to address the
guardianship of C.S. The trial court could not properly accept the guardianship petition and
the evidence yielded by those hearings could not provide a basis for the grant of
Grandmother's guardianship petition.See footnote
3
Furthermore, the trial court improperly relinquished
its CHINS jurisdiction over C.S. to the extent that action was premised on the grant of the
guardianship order.
CONCLUSION
Because a CHINS action was pending when the Putnam court, acting in its probate
jurisdiction, accepted Grandmother's guardianship petition and conducted hearings on it,
the probate court was acting without jurisdiction to accept the petition or to conduct
evidentiary hearings on it. We reverse the guardianship order and the termination of the
CHINS action and remand.
Reversed and remanded.
RILEY, J., concurs.
SULLIVAN, J., dissents with opinion.
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
IN THE MATTER OF C.S., )
)
LILAC PARKER, )
)
Appellant-Respondent, )
)
vs. ) No. 67A01-9807-JV-252
)
PUTNAM COUNTY OFFICE OF FAMILY )
AND CHILDREN, and CHRISTINE LANE, )
)
Appellees-Petitioners, )
)
LARRY SIMPSON, )
)
Appellee-Respondent. )
SULLIVAN, Judge, dissenting
The majority holds that the Putnam Circuit Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to enter an order granting Grandmother's petition that she be appointed the guardian of C.S.
This holding is premised upon the conclusion that the guardianship petition should have been
dismissed because the CHINS matter was pending. This conclusion seems to rest, in turn,
upon the idea that a guardianship and a CHINS disposition are mutually inconsistent. They
are not.
I.C. 31-34-20-1(4) (West's Code Ann. Supp. 1998) provides that a CHINS
dispositional decree may [a]ward wardship to a person or shelter care facility." The statute,
however, specifically precludes a guardian so appointed from consenting to an adoption of
the child. I.C. 31-34-29-1(4).
Be that as it may, wardship carries with it the creation of a relationship of guardian
and ward. See I.C. 29-3-1-6 (West Code Ann. 1994) (defining Guardian). Furthermore,
ward is defined as the state of being in guardianship. Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 2575 (1993).
In this sense, I believe that a juvenile court may well have subject matter jurisdiction
coexistent with that of a probate court with regard to appointment of a guardian. Although
the Putnam Circuit Court, perhaps, should have transferred the formal request for
appointment of a guardian to the CHINS cause number and made the appointment in that
cause, the order is not rendered invalid for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In setting aside
the guardianship order and reinstating the CHINS proceeding, the majority unnecessarily
elevates form over substance.
I would affirm the order appointing Christine Lane as guardian of C.S. subject,
however, to the caveat that such appointment does not include the right of the guardian to
consent to adoption of the child.
Footnote:
1 At the March 5 hearing, the judge announced that "We are on record now for [the CHINS cause].
As I also understand, we have before the court as well a guardianship cause . . . ." R. at 164. At that hearing,
Mother's counsel objected to the court's consideration of the guardianship petition on grounds the court
lacked jurisdiction over the guardianship by virtue of the pendency of the CHINS action.
At the May 28 hearing, the judge mentioned only the CHINS cause number, but the guardianship
was also discussed: "Remember, it's a guardianship that we're talking about. It's a guardianship we're
talking about. The OFC is going to dismiss this [CHINS] case as soon as we figure out the reimbursement
costs." Id. at 245.
Footnote:
2 Because we hold the Putnam court lacked jurisdiction to conduct the proceedings which gave rise
to the guardianship order, we need not address Mother's alternative argument that once the Putnam court
relinquished its jurisdiction over the CHINS action, jurisdiction over C.S. returned to the Owen court where
the custody modification action was pending.
Footnote:
3 The case before us presents the unusual situation where a single court -- here, the Putnam Circuit
Court -- has both juvenile and probate jurisdiction and where the same judge might thus preside over cases
in which each type of jurisdiction is implicated. We do not exalt form over function with our holding that
one judge, presiding over a court with jurisdiction over both probate and juvenile matters, may not
simultaneously conduct probate and juvenile proceedings involving the same child.
We recognize initially the need for a rule which will allow consistent application of the pertinent
jurisdictional statutes to every county regardless of the number of courts in the county or the structure of the
county court system. We further note that probate and juvenile proceedings to which the same child is
subject will seldom involve the same parties. See, e.g., Ind. Code § 31-34-9-7 (county office of family and
children and guardian ad litem or court appointed special advocate are parties to CHINS proceedings).
In State ex rel. Camden v. Gibson Circuit Court, 640 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ind. 1994), our supreme court
suggested in the criminal context that the unique nature of juvenile proceedings requires a strict separation
of juvenile jurisdiction from that of other courts. It described the difference between a criminal charge filed
in adult court and a delinquency charge filed in juvenile court as "more than merely formal," and noted that
"this is true even when, as in this case, the same judge would be presiding over either adult or juvenile
proceedings." Id. We believe the unique nature of the CHINS proceeding requires a similar separation from
matters of probate jurisdiction.
Converted from WP6.1 by the Access Indiana Information Network