FOR PUBLICATION


ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:     
ANDREW C. KRULL    JEFFREY A. MODISETT
Indianapolis, Indiana    Attorney General of Indiana

             LIISI BRIEN
            Deputy Attorney General
            Indianapolis, Indiana

KATHRYN AZHAR,                 )
                                    )
    Appellant-Defendant,            )
                                    )
        vs.                         )    No. 29A02-9902-CR-96
                                    )
STATE OF INDIANA,                   )
                                    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.             )

                                

criminal contempt by the City Court, the procedure for appealing such a determination was specifically set out in IC 34-4-7-7 (1983).See footnote 1
    T he Indiana Rules for Trial De Novo, on the other hand, only apply following: (1) a civil judgment in city court; (2) an infraction or ordinance violation judgment in a city or town court; or (3) a misdemeanor trial in a city or town court. Id. These rules do not contemplate findings of direct contempt and apply solely to misdemeanor trials and judgments, be they civil or criminal or otherwise, rendered by city and town courts. Indeed, a court's ruling declaring a party guilty of contempt is not a judgment upon the merits, and does not constitute an adjudication of the rights of the litigants. Proctor v. Cole, 104 Ind. 373, 375, 3 N.E. 106, 107 (1885). As such, Azhar's contempt citation does not fall within the scope of the Rules of Trial De Novo and should have been appealed pursuant to the provisions of IC 34-4-7-7. The Superior Court was without jurisdiction to review the City Court's finding of direct criminal contempt against Azhar, and its refusal to do so was proper.
    In light of our holding that the Indiana Rules of Trial De Novo do not apply to contempt citations, we decline to address the timeliness of Azhar's request for trial de novo or the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition, we decline to consider the merits of Azhar's underlying contempt charge as it is not a proper issue in this appeal. She cannot raise the argument that the City Court erred in determining her conduct constituted direct criminal contempt on appeal from the Superior Court's denial of her request for trial

de novo. As stated above, any error in the City Court's finding of contempt against Azhar should have been raised in a direct appeal from that ruling in accordance with IC 34-4-7-7.     We note additionally that inherent in the contempt appeals procedure set forth in the Indiana Code is the notion that an appeal will only lie from a final judgment, after punishment has been imposed. See State ex rel. Neal v. Hamilton Circuit Court, 248 Ind. 130, 134, 224 N.E.2d 55, 58 (1967). “[T]here is no appealable final judgment in contempt cases until the court has proceeded to attach and punish the defendant for contempt by fine or imprisonment.” Neal, 248 Ind. at 134, 224 N.E.2d at 58. Hence, where Azhar's $25 fine for contempt was suspended by the City Court, there was no final judgment, and therefore no basis for an appeal. Id.
    Our holding today should not be construed to condone the words or deeds of Judge Pro Tempore Zaiger in this case. The image which he portrayed and the attitude which he fostered when proclaiming, “I can do anything I want,” causes us great concern. While trial judges utilize discretion in rendering decisions, that discretion is not a license, is not without limits, and can be abused. “A judge is not free, like a loose cannon, to inflict indiscriminate damage whenever he announces that he is acting in his judicial capacity.” Stump v. Sparkman, 425 U.S. 349, 367, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331, 346, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 1110 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Although we as “[j]udges are leaders . . . we must remain ever alert to the fact that we are servant leaders.” Macon v. State, 629 N.E.2d 883, 885 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). Judge Zaiger's increase in the fine makes it appear that he was punishing Azhar for appearing in person before the court and exercising her due process rights under the law. See

Craig v. State, 571 N.E.2d 1326, 1327 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (holding it is a denial of due process to impose a greater sentence on a criminal contempt defendant after he successfully appeals conviction, and that to permit increased punishment opens door to vindictive sentencing that retaliates against defendant for exercising rights). His failure to respond in any meaningful way to Azhar's questions lends support to that inference.
    Affirmed.
GARRARD, J., and NAJAM, J., concur.

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