S. Sargent Visher
Jeffery A. Modisett
Janet Brown Mallett
Indianapolis, IndianaAttorneys for Appellee
Attorney General of Indiana
Deputy Attorney General
S. Sargent Visher
Jeffery A. Modisett
Janet Brown Mallett
Appellant (Defendant below),
STATE OF INDIANA,
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
) Supreme Court No.
Defendant Steve McQueen was identified by his cousin and convicted by a jury as the killer of a man who had been missing for a year. He appeals, arguing that he was improperly detained before trial and that the trial court admitted evidence and instructed
the jury incorrectly. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court.
We have jurisdiction over this direct appeal because the longest single sentence exceeds 50 years. Ind. Const. art. VII, § 4; Ind. Appellate Rule 4(A)(7).
dant to release pending trial and does not preclude subsequent prosecution, so long as the
one-year limitation of Crim.R. 4(C)See footnote
is met. Battle v. State, 415 N.E.2d 39, 41 (Ind. 1981);
Collins v. State, 364 N.E.2d 750, 755 (Ind. 1977). That is, Rule 4(A) provides for release
pending trial, but it makes no provision for discharge. Even assuming that the trial was
delayed more than six months beyond the critical date as fixed by Crim.R. 4(A), the State
was, nevertheless, authorized to bring Defendant to trial. Defendant is not entitled to the
relief he seeks.
Under the reasoning offered by Defendant, any violation of Crim.R. 4(A) would
likely constitute unnecessary rigor, violating Article I, § 15. Article I, § 15 is not a catch-
all provision applicable to every adverse condition accompanying confinement. Rather, it
serves to prohibit extreme instances of mistreatment and abuse. As we have stated previously:
Cases recognizing violations of Article 1, Section 15 involve situations where a prisoner was tortured, had a tooth knocked out, was repeatedly beaten, kicked and struck with a blackjack and beaten with a rubber hose while he was stretched across a table, Kokenes v. State, 213 Ind. 476, 13 N.E.2d 524 (1938), where a prisoner was beaten with police officer's fists in both eyes, cut on the top of his head, and beaten with a rubber hose on the head and ears, Bonahoon v. State, 203 Ind. 51, 178 N.E. 570 (1931), and where a prisoner was severely injured after being shot by police during a protest, Roberts v. State, 159 Ind.App. 456, 307 N.E.2d 501 (1974).
Ratliff v. Cohn, 693 N.E.2d 530, 541 (Ind. 1998). Given this standard, we find that Defendant's imprisonment pending trial, while exceeding the six-month period outlined in
Crim.R. 4(A), does not rise to the level of the unnecessary rigor contemplated by Article
I, § 15.
pictures were irrelevant because the parties stipulated that the skeletal remains found in a
ditch in Starke County were those of Jake Lumpkin and that the cause of death was multiple
gunshot wounds to the head. Even if they were relevant, he argues, their prejudicial effect
outweighed their probative value and they should have been excluded.
The admission of photographic evidence falls within the sound discretion of the trial
court and we will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. Amburgey v. State, 696 N.E.2d
44, 45 (Ind. 1998). The fact that a photograph may depict gruesome details of a crime is not
a sufficient basis for its exclusion. Isaacs v. State, 659 N.E.2d 1036, 1043 (Ind. 1995). The
question is whether the photograph's probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Id.;
Mitchell v. State, 557 N.E.2d 660, 665 (Ind. 1990).
Although the identity of the remains recovered by police and the cause of death were stipulated by the parties, the precise nature of the injuries suffered by the victim were not. The photographs at issue here were admitted in conjunction with expert testimony to explain the nature and location of the victim's wounds, as well as to describe other evidence obtained from the expert's examination of the remains. Such information served to illustrate the testimony of the State's expert. While we agree that courts must be cautious of inflammatory and cumulative evidence, we are not persuaded that the photographs at issue were so prejudicial as to influence the jury improperly. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs.
Under the relevant statutory provision,See footnote
there is no distinction between the criminal
responsibility of a principal and that of an accomplice. Marshall v. State, 621 N.E.2d 308,
313 (Ind. 1993). Thus, one may be charged as a principal yet convicted as an accomplice.
Hoskins v. State, 441 N.E.2d 419, 425 (Ind. 1982). Accordingly, this Court has repeatedly
held that where one is charged as a principal it is not error to instruct on the crime of aiding
in the commission of the crime when there is evidence to support such an instruction. Jones
v. State, 697 N.E.2d 57, 60 (Ind. 1998); Wright v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1098, 1104 (Ind. 1997);
Whittle v. State, 542 N.E.2d 981, 991 (Ind. 1989); Fisher v. State, 468 N.E.2d 1365, 1369
(Ind. 1984); Doss v. State, 267 N.E.2d 385, 389 (Ind. 1971). In such an instance, the
instruction on accessory liability does not represent an additional charge or a new theory of
the case. Hoskins, 441 N.E.2d at 425.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SELBY, and BOEHM, JJ., concur.
Defendant in Jail. No defendant shall be detained in jail on a charge, without a trial, for a period in aggregate embracing more than six (6) months from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge (whichever is later); except where a continuance was had on his motion, or the delay was caused by his act, or where there was not sufficient time to try him during such period because of congestion of the court calendar. . . . Any defendant so detained shall be released on his own recognizance at the conclusion of the six- month period aforesaid and may be held to answer a criminal charge against him within the limitations provided for in subsection (C) of this rule.
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