FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
STEVEN K. ROBISON ROBERT C. RUPP
Montgomery, Elsner & Pardieck Indianapolis, Indiana
Seymour, Indiana
ROBERT W. WAYMAN, )
)
Appellant-Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 93A02-9712-EX-867
)
J & S PETROLEUM, INC., )
)
Appellee-Defendant. )
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
Robert Wayman appeals from a decision of the Worker's Compensation Board of
Indiana ("Board"). He presents one issue: whether the Board "erred as a matter of law in
reversing its hearing officer's award without presenting any findings of fact or legal
conclusion."
On April 10, 1992, during his employment as a fuel oil and farm delivery truck driver
for J & S Petroleum ("J & S"), Wayman attempted to load a 120 pound oil barrel onto his
truck. As he did so, he felt something "give way" in his left arm. When he began to feel a
weakness in his left arm, Wayman reported the incident to J & S personnel. J & S contacted
its worker's compensation carrier.
Eventually, Wayman saw Dr. Rick Sasso, who found that Wayman's arm problems
were caused by a herniated disc between cervical vertebrae 5 and 6. Following Sasso's
advice, Wayman underwent surgery in September of 1992 to remove the protruding disc and
fuse the vertebrae. Sasso's notes from subsequent examinations indicate that the surgery
relieved Wayman's pain and weakness in his upper back and left arm, and that the exercises
Sasso recommended improved Wayman's strength in his left arm. On December 9, 1992,
Sasso assigned Wayman a permanent partial impairment rating of 10% and permitted him
to return to work without restrictions. Wayman returned to work that same day.
J & S's worker's compensation carrier agreed to pay Wayman temporary total
disability benefits for the period between his September 29, 1992 surgery and his December
13, 1992 release from Sasso's care. In addition, the worker's compensation carrier agreed to
pay Wayman a lump sum of $5,000 for his 10% permanent partial impairment rating.
Between January and March of 1993, W
ayman began noticing a recurrence of the
weakness in his left arm and claims to have notified his employer of the problem.
In March
of 1993, J & S was sold to a different company, for which Wayman worked until being
discharged due to route consolidation. In May of 1993, Wayman saw Sasso for further
diagnosis. Sasso ordered an MRI which revealed that Wayman had a herniated disc at the
C3-4 level and also at the C4-5. Sasso's notes indicated that these disc herniations were not
present when an initial MRI was conducted in 1992.
Gradually, Wayman lost all the strength he had recovered in his arm after surgery.
On June 25, 1993, Wayman filed for adjustment of his worker's compensation claim. A
hearing on the matter was held in the fall of 1996. In December of 1996, a single hearing
judge issued a detailed order which stated, inter alia:
It is further found that:
1. [Wayman] sustained a cervical disc injury on April 10, 1992 and
underwent disc fusion surgery at the C5-6 level on September 29, 1992.
2. [Wayman] applied for and received unemployment following his
discharge from defendant's employ. He gained other employment sometime
in March 1994 and is working presently.
3. After several months of successful rehabilitation, [Wayman] began
experiencing pain and weakness in his left arm and shoulder. [Wayman] did
not report these symptoms to defendant as a separate work injury. These
symptoms have persisted and worsened.
4. An MRI examination conducted at the direction of [Wayman]'s
original treating physician, Dr. Rick Sasso, in May 1993, revealed two
additional disc herniations at the C3-4 levels. These herniations did not appear
from an MRI and other examinations conducted after [Wayman]'s injury and
before his surgery. Additional fusion surgery has been recommended by Dr.
Sasso.
5. Dr. Sasso's notes and records indicate his belief that [Wayman] is a
cooperative and reliable patient who was making a substantial recovery before
his condition worsened in March, 1993. In particular, Dr. Sasso notes
increased arm strength resulting from [Wayman]'s adherence to his physical
therapy regimen.
6. Neither [Wayman] [n]or defendant has identified any incident that
may have caused [Wayman]'s onset of symptoms in March, 1993.
are designed to afford injured employees an expeditious remedy independent of any
negligence"). Since the initial determination is a summary proceeding, the individual hearing
judge need only file an award and the record of proceedings, Rork, 436 N.E.2d at 67, but may
file findings and conclusions.
If review is requested, the Board may in its discretion either look over the transcript,
or conduct a full hearing de novo. Ind. Code § 22-3-4-7; Schreiber v. Rickert, 50 N.E.2d
879, 881 (Ind. Ct. App. 1943). Whichever approach the Board chooses, it must cautiously
scrutinize any statements or rationale offered by the hearing judge in the initial summary
disposition of the case. Rork, 436 N.E.2d at 67. Assuming the appropriate scrutiny occurred,
the Board is neither prohibited by statute from, nor judicially condemned for, adopting the
hearing judge's decision. Id. Moreover, where the hearing judge's statements or findings
are supported by the evidence and embody the requisite specificity, the Board should not
hesitate to adopt and incorporate by reference the hearing officer's work. Id.
Here, however, the Board did not adopt or incorporate by reference the hearing
officer's work. Rather, the Board simply reversed the single hearing judge's decision. The
Board's approach was inconsistent with the Worker's Compensation Act which provides:
If an application for review is made to the board within thirty (30) days from
the date of the award made by less than all the members, the full board, if the
first hearing was not held before the full board, shall review the evidence, or,
if deemed advisable, hear the parties at issue, their representatives, and
witnesses as soon as practicable and shall make an award and file the same
with the finding of the facts on which it is based and send a copy thereof to
each of the parties in dispute, in like manner as specified in section 6 of this
chapter.
Ind. Code § 22-3-4-7 (emphasis added). "An administrative agency must in all cases set out
written findings of fact in support of its decision so that an appellate court may intelligently
review the decision without speculating as to the agency's rationale." Jackson v. Cigna/Ford
Electronics and Refrig. Corp., 677 N.E.2d 1098, 1102 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Talas v.
Correct Piping Co., 275 Ind. 261, 416 N.E.2d 845, 846 (1981) and Perez v. United States
Steel Corp., 426 N.E.2d 29, 31 (Ind. 1981)). "It is the Full Industrial Board's opinion which
the legislature has required; the requirement that the seven members of the Board enumerate
their findings of fact is a prophylactic measure against arbitrary or hastily drawn decisions[.]"
Rork, 436 N.E.2d at 67.
Here, we need not address the sufficiency of the Board's findings as the Board made
none. The Board merely stated that Wayman would "take nothing."
By disposing of the
present case in such an abbreviated manner, the Board thwarted the goals of expeditious and
effective review of Board determinations and protection against careless or arbitrary
administrative action
. See Perez, 426 N.E.2d at 32. Faced with no way to review the Board's
determination as presently written, we reverse the full Board's decision and remand with
instructions to enter specific findings of fact upon which the award was based.
Reversed and remanded.
SHARPNACK, J. and FRIEDLANDER, J. concur.
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