ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kurt A. Young Steve Carter
Nashville, IN Attorney General of Indiana
Joseph A. Samreta
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, IN
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
RAYLON D. YOUNG, )
)
Appellant (Defendant Below ), )
)
v. ) Cause No. 49S00-0012-CR-806
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee (Plaintiff Below ). )
After Young fired the shots, the car continued down the street, turned around,
and came back towards the group. As the car passed the house
a second time, Young fired several more shots while leaning out the passenger
window and shooting across the hood of the car.
Youngs lawyer conceded during closing argument that Young killed Roney. He also
conceded that Youngs behavior was reckless. Thus, the only serious dispute was
whether Young acted knowingly, or merely recklessly.
To convict for murder, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed another human being.
See footnote Ind. Code Ann.
§ 35-42-1-1(1) (West 1998). A person engages in conduct knowingly if, when
he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that
he is doing so. Ind. Code Ann. § 35-41-2-2(b) (West 1998).
One engages in conduct recklessly if he engages in the conduct in plain,
conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves
a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.
Id. at § 35-41-2-2(c).
Thus, to sustain the verdict, the evidence must show that Young was aware
of a high probability that someones death would result from his actions.
Because knowledge is the mental state of the actor, the trier of fact
must resort to reasonable inferences of its existence. Jernigan v. State, 612
N.E.2d 609 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
A knowing killing may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon
in a way likely to cause death. Barker v. State, 695 N.E.2d
925 (Ind. 1998). Youngs firing of multiple shots at a group of
people gathered on a front lawn, killing Korey Roney, was adequate evidence to
permit a jury to conclude that Young used a deadly weapon in a
manner likely to cause death or serious injury.
Moreover, intent may be inferred from the severity, duration, or brutality of the
attack. Mitchell v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1228 (Ind. 2000). Several witnesses
saw Young point a gun at the group and fire multiple shots.
After driving away, Young returned and fired several more shots at the group.
The nature and duration of the attack also sustain the jurys conclusion
that Young was aware of a high probability that his actions would result
in someones death.
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.