ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Jeffrey W. Waggoner Michael D. Marine
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
Bradley L. Williams
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
BRADLEY A. TURNER, )
)
Appellant (Plaintiff Below ), )
) 82S05-0008-CV-479
) in the Supreme Court
v. )
) 82A05-9908-CV-358
CITY OF EVANSVILLE, et al., ) in the Court of Appeals
)
Appellees (Defendants Below ). )
APPEAL FROM THE VANDERBURGH CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Carl A. Heldt
Cause No. 82C01-9812-CP-397
January 18, 2001
SHEPARD, Chief Justice.
The Chief of the Evansville Police Department imposed discipline on an officer, who
appealed to the Citys Police Merit Commission. The officer then sued the
Commission, the Chief, and others, seeking to prevent a hearing on the merits
of his appeal and challenging the Chiefs right to hold office, the lawfulness
of the Commissions existence and the validity of an agreement between the City
and the Fraternal Order of Police. We hold that these matters may
be the subject of review sought after any final decision of the Commission
but may not be pursued collaterally through this lawsuit.
Facts and Procedural History
Appellant Bradley A. Turner began his service with the Evansville Police Department in
January 1995, hired from a list created by the Evansville Police Merit Commission.
The current dispute began when Chief of Police Arthur A. Gann issued
Turner written reprimands on two occasions in 1997, once for failing to use
reasonable care in the use of a motor vehicle, and again for failing
to follow the police departments standard operating procedures.
Chief Gann suspended Turner in early August 1998 for twenty-one days, with pay,
for giving false information in a statement to Internal Affairs and in testimony
to the Merit Commission regarding a disciplinary action against another officer. Turner
filed a notice of appeal with the Merit Commission regarding this suspension.
When Marvin D. Guest replaced Gann as Chief of Police in late August
1998, Chief Guest amended Turners suspension to be served without pay. Turner
appealed this amended suspension to the Merit Commission. In late 1998, Guest
suspended Turner two more times, first for failing to follow standard operating procedures
and repeated violations, and later for being absent from roll call and his
assigned posts at the time prescribed and for repeated violations. (R. at
127-28, 130-31.) Turner filed a notice of appeal for each of these
suspensions.
All three of Turners appeals remain pending before the Merit Commission. Before
they could be heard, Turner filed a lawsuit challenging the past and present
Chiefs right to office, the ordinance establishing the Merit Commission and an agreement
between the City and the Fraternal Order of Police. He asked the
court to enjoin the Commission from conducting a disciplinary hearing while his lawsuit
proceeded. The court issued such an order, and it still pends.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Court of
Appeals affirmed. Among other things, it held the Evansville Police Merit Commission
was properly constituted under the relevant statutes and that the Chief of Police
was obliged by Article 6, section 6 of the Indiana Constitution to live
inside the city limits. Turner v. City of Evansville, 729 N.E.2d 149
(Ind. Ct. App. 2000). We grant transfer and vacate the decision of
the Court of Appeals.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
It has long been Indiana law that a claimant with an available administrative
remedy must pursue that remedy before being allowed access to the courts.
City of East Chicago v. Sinclair Refining Co., 232 Ind. 295, 111 N.E.2d
459 (1953). If a party fails to exhaust administrative remedies, the trial
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Town Council of New Harmony v. Parker,
726 N.E.2d 1217 (Ind. 2000).
See footnote
We recently re-emphasized the value of completing administrative proceedings before resorting to judicial
review in
State Bd. Of Tax Comrs v. Montgomery, 730 N.E.2d 680, 684
(Ind. 2000)(quoting State v. Sproles, 672 N.E.2d 1353, 1358 (Ind. 1996)),
The reasons for requiring a party to seek administrative remedies are well established.
Premature litigation may be avoided, an adequate record for judicial review may
be compiled, and agencies retain the opportunity and autonomy to correct their own
errors. Even if the ground of complaint is the unconstitutionality of the statute,
which may be beyond the agencys power to resolve, exhaustion may still be
required because administrative action may resolve the case on other grounds without confronting
broader legal issues.
(Citation omitted.)
Turner appropriately filed a notice of appeal of each of his suspensions with
the Merit Commission, which would go forward but for the restraining order obtained
by Turner. This right of appeal from discipline by a Chief is
common in Indianas various statutory schemes. See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. §
36-8-3.5-19(b)(West 1997). A decision by the commission is also subject to judicial
review. Ind. Code Ann. § 36-8-3.5-18 (West 1997). Turners challenges to
the Chiefs authority, and the Commissions own compliance with relevant statutes may be
challenged before the body and subsequently raised in court through the process of
judicial review. See, e.g., City of Marion v. Antrobus, 448 N.E.2d 325
(Ind. Ct. App. 1983)(board whose composition was challenged at officers disciplinary hearing later
held on judicial review to be unlawfully constituted, officers suspension reversed). To
preserve these issues for judicial review, Turner must first present them at the
administrative hearing. See Sullivan v. City of Evansville, 728 N.E.2d 182 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2000)(plaintiff waived challenge to authority of police chief by failing to
make a timely objection at the hearing).
Turner was required to pursue his administrative remedies and may not avoid doing
so through this collateral action.
See footnote Consequently, the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to address the merits of Turners amended complaint.
Conclusion
Having heard the Citys motions, the trial court
granted summary judgment and also ordered dismissal. It was the latter action
that was appropriate. We affirm the dismissal and direct the court to
dissolve the injunction preventing the Merit Commission from hearing Turners appeal.
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, Rucker, JJ., concur.
Boehm, J., concurs with opinion, in which Dickson and Rucker, JJ., join.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Jeffrey W. Waggoner Michael D. Marine
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
Bradley L. Williams
Indianapolis, Indiana
________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
________________________________________________________________________
BRADLEY A. TURNER
, )
)
Appellant(Plaintiff Below), ) Indiana Supreme Court
) Cause No. 82S05-0008-CV-479
v. )
) Indiana Court of Appeals
CITY OF EVANSVILLE et al., ) Cause No. 82A05-9908-CV-358
)
Appellees (Defendants Below). )
________________________________________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE VANDERBURGH CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Carl A. Heldt, Judge
Cause No. 82C01-9812-CP-397
________________________________________________________________________
ON PETITION FOR TRANSFER
__________________________________________________________________
January 18, 2001 [DATE]
BOEHM, Justice, concurring.
I join in the opinion of the Court. Because that opinion adequately
disposes of this case, I would normally be content to leave resolution of
the issue presented by the merits of this case for another day.
However, the Court of Appeals addressed an important question in holding that the
Indiana Constitution requires that the police chief reside within the Evansville city limits.
I agree that Turner has no standing to raise that issue in this
lawsuit. Nevertheless, for better or worse, the Court of Appeals has resolved
the issue in a published opinion that I assume affects a number of
public safety officials and perhaps others serving local governmental units across Indiana.
Rather than leave these public servants in doubt as to the need to
resign their positions or relocate their families, I would address the question of
who is an officer within the meaning of Article VI, Section 6 of
the Indiana Constitution. It is my view that the Evansville Chief of
Police is not subject to the residency requirement in Article VI, Section 6.
The origin of the residency provision can be traced to Article XI, Section
6 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816:
All officers shall reside within the state; and all District, County, or Town
officers, within their respective Districts, Counties, or towns (the trustees of the town
of Clarkesville [sic] excepted) and shall keep their respective offices, at such places
therein, as may be directed by law; and all Militia officers shall reside
within the bounds of the Division, Brigade, Regiment, Battalion or company to which
they may severally belong.
The proceedings of the 1850 constitutional convention shed little light on the purpose
of the original provision or the modified version we now find in Article
VI, Section 6. The 1850 debate was concerned solely with the exception
for the trustees of the town of Clarksville. That exception did not
survive the constitutional convention.
See footnote
The constitutions of 1816 and 1851 were written
in an era of vastly simpler government, when transportation and communications were extremely
difficult.
See footnote
In 1815, Indianas population was fewer than 64,000 women, men, and
children living in small communities dotting a 36,000 square mile expanse.
It seems to me that the officers contemplated by this constitutional provision are
those identified in the Indiana Constitution itself as officers and those county, township,
and town officials who have been identified by statute as those who, in
the terms of Article VI, Section 3, are elected or appointed by law
to perform similar functions. I assume no one would argue that every
statutorily provided public employee is an officer for these purposes. If that
is correct, some rather bright line is required here to permit these public
servants and their employers to go about their business with confidence that there
will not be constant skirmishing over eligibility to hold municipal and county jobs.
Since 1863, a number of appellate decisions have struggled to determine which local
officials are officers within the meaning of Article VI, Section 6. Everyone
seems to agree that the term, at a minimum, embraces the officers identified
as such in the constitution itself. These are the county clerk, auditor,
recorder, treasurer, sheriff, coroner, and surveyor. In addition, the senior legislative components
of local government are required to live in their jurisdictions. All of
the foregoing are elected to their posts. Some decisions have held other
public servants to be constitutional officers.
Relender v. State ex rel. Utz,
149 Ind. 283, 288, 49 N.E. 30, 32 (1898) (Members of a board
of commissioners are certainly county officers . . . .); Yonkey v. State
ex rel. Cornelison, 27 Ind. 237, 240-41 (1866) (county recorder is officer); State
ex rel. Cornwall v. Allen, 21 Ind. 516, 521 (1863) (county auditor is
officer); City of Marion v. Antrobus, 448 N.E.2d 325, 330 (Ind. Ct. App.
1983) (members of the city Board of Public Works and Safety are officers);
Willsey v. Newlon, 161 Ind. App. 332, 334, 316 N.E.2d 390, 392 (1974)
(township justice of peace is an officer).
In 1980, the General Assembly imposed residency requirements on twenty county, township, and
town positions that were specifically identified as subject to Article VI, Section 6.
See footnote
This list did not include any law enforcement personnel beyond the constitutionally
created office of county sheriff. In addition to the list tied specifically
to Article VI, Section 6, a variety of statutes impose other residency requirements.
Ind.Code § 33-14-1-1.5 (Supp. 2000) (prosecuting attorney must reside in same judicial
circuit); id. § 36-4-9-11 (1998) (corporation counsel of city with population greater than
6,000 must live within county); id. § 36-7-4-216 (citizen members of plan commission
must be residents of the jurisdictional area of the commission); id. § 36-7-14-7
(Supp. 2000) (redevelopment commissioner must be resident of unit that he serves); id.
§ 36-8-3.5-6 (1998) (member of merit commission must have been resident of local
unit for three years before appointment); id. § 36-8-4-2 (Supp. 2000) (members of
police and fire departments must live within county where city, town, or township
is located, or in a contiguous county).
Although this Court is certainly not bound by the legislatures interpretation of the
term officer as used in Article VI, Section 6, it seems to me
that the General Assemblys conclusions are correct. The top executive individuals and
bodies of counties, towns, and townships are included, as are the analogs to
the constitutionally created offices. The elected sheriff, who reports to no one,
is the sole law enforcement official on the list. In contrast, a
city chief of police normally is accountable to a mayor, a board of
safety or merit commission, or both. Here, the police chiefs control over
the police department is not absolute; it is tempered by the mayors oversight
and the Evansville Merit Commissions exclusive authority over hiring, firing, and disciplinary matters.
Evansville, Ind., Code § 3.30.37.509(B) & 30.37.505 to .528.
I agree that various public servants, including chiefs of police, may be officers
within the meaning of some statutes. However, this is purely a matter
of legislative construction. Thus, I have no trouble agreeing that the legislature
intended to include the chief of police in an anti-corruption prohibition applicable to
local officers.
State v. Carey, 241 Ind. 692, 175 N.E.2d 354 (1961).
But Carey seems to shed little light on the use of the
same term in the 150-year-old residency requirement of the state constitution, which presumably
had in mind the goals of political accountability and familiarity with local issues.
Moreover, the word officer is used in various statutes to describe a
number of public servants whom no one would identify as constitutional officers.
For example, although the code refers to law enforcement officers, I do not
believe that anyone would suggest that every policeman or deputy throughout the state
of Indiana is subject to Article VI, Section 6. Secondly, the test
sometimes cited for identifying an officerone who exercises sovereign authorityclearly applies to law
enforcement and regulatory officials.
In sum, practical considerations of geography and limited communication undoubtedly influenced the
constitutional residency requirement at its origin. These are no longer as significant,
but the assumed goals of political accountability and familiarity with local issues remain.
In my view, neither goal is sufficiently served by extension of Article
VI, Section 6 to an appointed city chief of police who is himself
accountable to a layer of constitutional officers.
DICKSON and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
Footnote:
A party may gain judicial review without satisfying this prerequisite in limited
circumstances, such as where pursuit of administrative remedies would be futile, or where
strict compliance would cause irreparable harm, or where the applicable statute is alleged
to be void on its face. Bellamy v. Gillis, 722 N.E.2d 905,
909 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). None of these seem to apply here.
Footnote:
A proper challenge to an office is made by filing a quo
warranto action. Hovenac v. Diaz, 397 N.E.2d 1249, 1250 (Ind. 1979).
Footnote:
Clarksville has a unique origin. It was created by the state
of Virginia in 1783 out of lands granted to the Illinois regiment.
The Virginia legislature set aside one thousand acres for the creation of the
town of Clarksville and appointed ten men, including George Rogers Clark, as the
board of commissioners of the town. It was their duty to survey
and distribute the resulting parcels. The 1783 act also gave the board
of commissioners the unusual ability to choose its own successors. The propriety
of the entire arrangement was challenged in a dispute that reached the United
States Supreme Court in 1832. Hughes v. Trustees of Clarksville, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 369 (1832). An opinion authored by Chief Justice Marshall upheld
the strange composition of the Clarksville town trustees. I have been unable
to find any explanation of the 1816 Indiana Constitutions exemption of the trustees
of Clarksville from the residency requirement of Article XI, Section 6. In
any event, by 1850, constitutional delegates had lost any sympathy for the trustees
of one townno matter how unique its originswho chose to live in another.
1 Report of the Debate and Proceedings of the Convention for the
Revision of the Constitution of the State of Indiana 930-31 (Indiana Historical Collections
Reprint, 1935).
Footnote:
William Huff, a delegate to the constitutional convention of 1850, reminded the
convention of the difficulties of travel. He first pointed out the scarcity
of good roads and bridges, and continued:
The two counties [Spencer and Perry] front about one hundred miles on the
Ohio river, and there are some five or six considerable sized streams emptying
into the Ohio . . . which makes it very inconvenient for the
citizens . . . to get to and from their county seats.
In fact, it is sometimes almost impossible without going to the river and
boarding a boat; or, if they cannot get a boat without waiting too
long, they sometimes throw a couple of logs in and fasten them together
and board them. This kind of conveyance will do very well if
they wish to go down stream, but it will not do so well
for traveling up stream, and consequently they have to depend entirely on a
boat; and if no boat comes in time, they cannot go at all.
Debates at 932.
Footnote:
Those positions are: city court judge (Ind.Code § 33-10.1-3-2 (1998)); member of
the county executive (id. § 36-2-2-5); member of the county fiscal body (id.
§ 36-2-3-5); county auditor (id. § 36-2-9-2); county treasurer (id. § 36-2-10-2); county
recorder (id. § 36-2-11-2); county surveyor (id. § 36-2-12-2); county sheriff (id. §
36-2-13-2); county coroner (id. § 36-2-14-2); county assessor (id. § 36-2-15-2); executive of
UNIGOV (id. § 36-3-3-4); city-county council of UNIGOV (id. § 36-3-4-2); mayor (id.
§ 36-4-5-2); common council/city legislative body (id. § 36-4-6-2); city clerk (id. §
36-4-10-3); town legislative body (id. § 36-5-2-6); town clerk-treasurer (id. § 36-5-6-3); township
trustee (id. § 36-6-4-2); township assessor (id. § 36-6-5-1 (Supp. 2000)); and township
legislative body (id. § 36-6-6-3 (1998)).